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# The Competitive Effects of Charter Schools: Evidence from the District of Columbia

11/15/2012


# Overview

- Motivation for the Study
- Prior Research Approaches
- Current Approach
- Analytic Findings
- Summary and Further Directions

# Importance of Study - I

- Charter schools the largest school choice AND school reform initiative in the US today
  - Charter schools are publicly funded schools operated by independent organizations
  - “Flexibility for accountability”
    - Oversight by designated “Authorizers”
    - Operate with fewer regulations than traditional public schools (TPS)
    - Limited term then must face renewal review
  - Parents must voluntarily enroll their children
  - Funding follows the child.....mostly

# The Landscape Today



# Importance of the Study - II


- Performance has been shown to be mixed
  - Across states, outcomes differ -- after controls for student and school attributes
  - Findings suggest policy matters
  - Focus on enabling legislation and authorizing to set quality standards at two key points
    - Application to open charter school
    - End of charter term review for possible renewal

# Importance of the Study - III

- For 20 years, charter schools have faced multiple and conflicting priorities


# The Promise of Charter Schools

## School reform policy



# The Promise of Charter Schools

Models of innovation





# The Promise of Charter Schools

## Focus on Underserved Students



Characteristic	Change in average reading scale score		Change in average mathematics scale score
	Since 1992	Since 2005	Since 2005
<b>Overall</b>	▼	▲	▲
<b>Race-ethnicity</b>			
White	◆	▲	▲
Black	◆	◆	▲
Hispanic	◆	◆	▲
Asian/Pacific Islander	◆	▲	▲
American Indian/Alaska Native	‡	◆	▲
<b>Gaps</b>			
White – Black	◆	◆	◆
White – Hispanic	◆	◆	◆
Male – Female	◆	◆	◆
	▲	Higher in 2009	
Source: 2009 NAEP Trends	▼	Lower in 2009	9
	◆	Same in 2009	

# The Promise of Charter Schools

Vehicles for growing  
“healthy” competition  
in public education  
at primary and  
secondary levels



# Importance of the Study - III

- For 20 years, charter schools have faced multiple and conflicting priorities


BUT....

- After 20 years, and billions of dollars of new investments, **2 million students** in charters
- If we rely on charter schools alone to save US students, it will take 200 years
- But if they stimulate improvement in TPS....

# Three Possible Mechanisms of Charter Impact on TPS

- **Merhaba!!** Simple Market Presence
  - *Do TPS in charter markets show generally higher performance than in monopoly markets?*
- Market-wide analysis –
  - *# of charters, density or proximity*
- Early studies showed little or no impact
  - *Holmes, DeSimone & Rupp, 2003, Ni, 2005, Bifulco and Ladd, 2006*

# Largest Charter School Markets



# Three Possible Mechanisms of Charter Impact on TPS

- **Butts in Chairs** Charter Market Share
  - *Do TPS in markets with high penetration outperform TPS in low- or no-penetration markets?*
- Market-wide or multi-site analysis
  - *Can mask variation in quality of charter schools*
  - *Budget relief may dampen effects*
- Levitt et al, 2005; Ny et al, 2009

# Three Mechanisms of Charter Impact on TPS

- **What the Heck?!?**

## Elastic Response to CS Quality

- *Do TPS “recognize” the signal of quality from their competitor charter schools and respond to it?*
- *Charter schools as “evidence proofs” of possibility to improve on historical outcomes*
- Sass, 2010; Imberman, 2011;
- *Studies use market-wide measures*
- *Results show no or minimal impact*

# Current Study

- Use panel data to follow students (not new)
  - Which TPS schools lose students to charters
  - Which charter schools are high performers
- Two contributions to the field:
  - Build micro-level markets of TPS and their competitors to examine “butts in chairs” and “WTH” mechanisms
  - Use Difference-in-differences (DID) estimation



# Current Study

- District of Columbia
  - Discrete market area
  - Consistently low performing traditional public schools
  - High concentrations of poverty and ethnic minorities
  - Charter schools since 1999, now have 120 schools
  - Real estate pressure influences location > mission
- Student-level testing data since 2006
- Permits 3 periods of growth to be estimated

# Attrition to Charters by TPS Quality

<b>Attrition Rate</b>	<b>2006-2007</b>	<b>2007-2008</b>	<b>2008-2009</b>
• <b>1% or less</b>	<b>.38</b>	<b>.68</b>	<b>.53</b>
• <b>2% or less</b>	<b>.50</b>	<b>.29</b>	<b>.55</b>
• <b>3% or less</b>	<b>.19</b>	<b>.28</b>	<b>.44</b>
• <b>7% or less</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>.08</b>
• <b>8% or less</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>.07</b>
• <b>9% or less</b>	<b>-.01</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.02</b>
• <b>13% or less</b>	<b>-.03</b>	<b>-.02</b>	<b>.01</b>
• <b>14% or less</b>	<b>-.03</b>	<b>-.03</b>	<b>.01</b>
• <b>15% or less</b>	<b>-.04</b>	<b>-.03</b>	<b>.00</b>

# Current Study Approach

- DID model of student performance
- $$Y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta_{1jt}(C_{jt}) + \beta_{2jt}(T_{jt}) + \beta_{3jt}(DND) + B_{3ijt}(D_{ijt}) + B_{4jt}(M_{jt}) + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

$Y_{ijt}$  is the measured growth in test scores for each student  $i$  attending TPS  $j$  in year  $t$ ,

$C_{jt}$  is a variable that signifies the presence of competition at TPS  $j$  in year  $t$ ,

$T_{jt}$  is a measure of the competitive signal that is available to TPS  $j$  in year  $t$ ,

$DND_{jt}$  is the interaction of the control and treatment for TPS  $j$  in year  $t$ ,

$D_{ijt}$  is a vector of student demographic and program participation controls that apply to student  $i$  in TPS  $j$  in year  $t$ ,

$M_{jt}$  is a vector of market controls for TPS  $j$  in year  $t$ , and

$\varepsilon_{ijt}$  is an error term for each student  $i$  in TPS  $j$  in year  $t$ .

# Current Study Approach

- Endogeneity due to charter school's location preferences create problems for OLS models
  - Not addressed in early studies
  - Two-stage model with IV
    - Bettinger's Michigan study used proximity to university or racial diversity
    - Not as useful in small market like DC
  - Fixed effects for schools or students
    - Zimmer created “spell effects” for year-student periods
    - Apply only to schools experiencing competition
    - Exclusion of “no competition” could bias estimates

# Current Study Approach

- Real question about endogeneity in DC
  - Open enrollment across district
  - Heavy real estate pressure makes strategic targeting by location improbable
  - Many schools move often in early years
- DnD abates endogeneity by making it explicit
  - Create thresholds of attrition to charter schools
  - 5%, 8%, 10%, 12% rates signal presence of competition
  - Arbitrary and increasingly implausible

# Analytic Findings

## Math results

Variable	5% attrition	8% attrition	10% attrition	12% attrition
Competition Threshold	-.07**	-.03**	-.04**	-.05**
Average Charter School Quality	.01	.05**	.04**	.04**
Average Charter School Quality DND	.08**	-.02	.04**	.03
Enrollment Trend Index	-.06**	-.05**	-.05**	-.05**
Number of Competing Charters	-.004**	-.005**	-.005**	-.005**

\* significant at 5%

\*\* significant at 1%

# Analytic Findings

## Reading results

Variable	5% attrition	8% attrition	10% attrition	12% attrition
Competition Threshold	-.11**	-.08**	-.08**	-.04**
Average Charter School Quality	-.009	.03*	.02	.04**
Average Charter School Quality DND	.12**	.07**	.15**	.06*
Enrollment Trend Index	-.03**	-.03**	-.03**	-.03**
Number of Competing Charters	-.007**	-.007**	-.008**	-.007**

\* significant at 5%

\*\* significant at 1%

# Sensitivity Tests – Alternate Quality Measures

## Charter school quality trajectory

Variable	5%	8%	10%	12%
Math				
Positive Trajectory DND	.07**	.02	.06**	.03
Reading				
Positive Trajectory DND	.09**	.10**	.14**	.06*

\* significant at 5%

\*\* significant at 1%



# Sensitivity Tests – Alternate Quality Measures

## Difference between TPS and Charter Quality

Variable	5%	8%	10%	12%
Math				
Average Quality Difference DND	.07**	-.08**	-.11**	-.10**
Reading				
Average Quality Difference DND	.17**	.17**	.03	-.07

\* significant at 5%

\*\* significant at 1%

# Fixed Effects Models

## “Butts in Chairs” Models with Fixed Effects

Competition Measure	OLS	Student FE	Student FE School FE
% Students in Charter Schools	R .067**	.038**	.021*
	M .055**	.011	.006
Lagged Attrition to Charters (with prior test score)	R -.442**	.776**	.538**
	M -.364**	.773**	.722**
(without prior test score)	R	.40	.816
	M	.530	.503

# Fixed Effects Models

## WTH Models with Fixed Effects

Competition Measure		OLS	Student FE	Student FE School FE
<b>Ave. Score of Charter Schools</b>	R	.356**	.05	.052
(with prior test score)	M	.243**	-.004	-.009
(without prior test score)	R		.163**	.182**
	M		.055	.043
<b>High Scoring Charter School</b>	R	.126**	.034**	.012
(with prior test score)	M	.112**	.002	.00
(without prior test score)	R		.067**	.054**
	M		.057**	.072**

# Summary and Further Questions

- Competitive impact fairly stable and significant when signal is simple and definition of “competition” is reasonable.
- Other controls reject market-wide factors as drivers of competitive effects
- Quality signals appear to have stronger impact than loss of students
- Modest policy support for competitive markets – stresses importance of overall charter quality