

European Department

Calibrating Monetary Policy in the Current Global Turmoil



Presentation by Mark Lewis
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Koç University -TÜSIAD ERF Conference: “Monetary Policy and the Global Economic Crisis”

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THE GLOBAL OUTLOOK

Activity is under threat. Policy requirements are:



Rebalancing I

From fiscal stimulus to private demand in AEs: fiscal **repair** and support for recovery; **bank capital**, housing markets; **vision for euro area**

Rebalancing II

From ca surplus countries to ca deficit countries: medium-term fiscal adjustment in AE; structural reforms and exchange rate flexibility in key EM

Reforms


Financial regulation, new macroprudential tools, strengthen global financial safety net; reform global financial system; trade

Global activity has slowed noticeably




World Trade

(annualized percent change of three-month moving average over previous three-month moving average)



Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI)

(index)




Financial stability risks have increased dramatically, especially in the euro area




Government Bond Spreads

(two-year yield spreads over German bunds; basis points)





Interbank Spreads

(three-month London interbank offered rate minus three-month government bill rate; basis points)



Capital flows to EM have turned negative



Source: EPFR Global.


Global growth 4 percent, but EM and AE very divergent




Real GDP Growth

(percent change from a year earlier)





Advanced Economies



Emerging Economies




What's different from "Lehman"?



Sovereign strains becoming more widespread ...



Credit Default Swap Spreads (basis points)




... threatening a shift towards a bad equilibrium




**Shock to Debt Dynamics for
Vulnerable Sovereign**

Bad Equilibrium
**Inadequate
Policy Response**




Good Equilibrium
**Adequate
Policy Response**



Advanced economies are stuck between repair and expansion phase of the credit cycle




Phases of the Credit Cycle




Emerging economies are further along in the credit cycle



Phases of the Credit Cycle




Emerging markets are in the expansion phase



1/ In percent of GDP

... and in many economies credit is running well ahead of GDP






IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY

Low policy rates encourage a “search for yield”



Fed Funds Rates, BBB-rated Corporate Credit Spreads, and U.S. Real GDP Cumulative Growth




Inflation has begun to moderate.




Headline Inflation

(Annualized percent change of three-month moving average over previous three-month moving average)



Core Inflation

(Twelve-month change)




AE monetary policy can stay very accommodative; stand ready for more unconventional support.




Real Short-Term Interest Rates

(percent; three-month treasury bill, relative to core inflation)



Policy Rate Expectations


(percent; months on x-axis; dashed lines are from the April 2011 World Economic Outlook.)




EM still need to tighten but a number of them can “wait and see” before normalizing further.



Policy Rates
(percent)



Summary of Taylor Deviations^{1,2}



¹AR: Argentina; BR: Brazil; CN: China; ID: Indonesia; IN: India; MX: Mexico; RU: Russia; TR: Turkey; ZA: South Africa.

²Taylor rule in the form of $i = \text{infl} + r^* + 0.5(\text{infl} - \text{infl}^*) + 0.5(\text{ygap})$. i is the policy rate (prescribed); infl is actual inflation, core inflation, and two-year WEO projected inflation; r^* is the equilibrium real rate = 2; infl^* is 2 percent for advanced economies and 4 percent for emerging economies; ygap is the output gap (WEO) and output relative to the precrisis trend in percent.



***WHAT HAS CHANGED FOR
MONETARY POLICY IN THE WAKE OF
THE GLOBAL CRISIS?***

Lessons– where are improvements in monetary policy needed



- Monetary frameworks
- Liquidity frameworks
- Macroprudential policies: assessment of systemic risk and responsibility of central banks for financial stability
- Other issues:
 - Managing capital flows
 - In countries with large fiscal deficits, constraints on monetary policy

Monetary policy



- Price stability should remain the primary objective of monetary policy...
- ...but should take more into account systemic risks
- Other considerations:
 - Should interest rate policy take into account asset prices?
 - Lengthen monetary policy horizon to address financial stability concerns?
- Communication and risks warnings may be a help, supplemented by macroprudential measures

Liquidity management



- Key elements of pre-crisis operational frameworks should be retained
- But some broadening of frameworks could increase resilience of the system
 - Higher reserve levels
 - Wide range of counterparties
 - Maintain sufficient collateral
 - Reduce stigma
 - Effective liquidity absorbing tools

Macro-prudential regulation



- Designed to address
 - Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)
 - Lessen pro-cyclical tendencies
 - Structural issues
- The key is that many of the tools are micro-prudential, but the motivation is to address systemic risk

Institutional set-ups for macro-prudential policy frameworks



- The central bank should play an important role.
- Fragmentation of institutions should be avoided, and strong coordination mechanisms are needed.
- Systemic risk prevention and crisis management are different functions that should be supported by separate arrangements.
- Macroprudential policy frameworks should not compromise the autonomy of other established policies
 - including monetary and microprudential policy
- Country-specific factors are crucial

Instruments and risks



■ Credit-related:

- caps on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio;
- caps on the debt-to-income (DTI) ratio;
- caps on foreign currency lending;
- ceilings on credit or credit growth.

■ Liquidity-related:

- limits on net open currency positions/currency mismatch (NOP);
- limits on maturity mismatch;
- reserve requirements.


■ Capital-related:

- countercyclical/time-varying capital requirements;
- time-varying/dynamic provisioning;
- restrictions on profit distribution.




- Risks generated by strong credit growth and asset price inflation.
- Systemic liquidity risk.
- Risks arising from excessive leverage and the consequent de-leveraging.
- Risks related to large and volatile capital flows.

What affects the choice of instruments?



Effectiveness of instruments



Panel regression: Statistically significant (✓) or not (✗)



| Reductions in: | Procyclicality of | | Interconnectedness | |
|---|-------------------|----------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | Credit | Leverage | Foreign funding | Wholesale funding |
| Caps on LTV | ✓ | ✗ | | |
| Caps on DTI | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| Limits on Credit Growth | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| Limits on NOP | | | ✓ | ✗ |
| Limits on Maturity Mismatch | | | ✗ | ✓ |
| Reserve Requirements | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| Time-varying/Dynamic Provisioning | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| Countercyclical/Time-varying Capital Requirements | ✗ | ✓ | | |

Using instruments: guidelines



Single vs. Multiple:

- use **single** when risk is well-defined from a single source;
- use **multiple** to tackle a risk from various angles but do not overdo.

Targeted vs. Broad-based:

- use **targeted** to minimize cost or distortion;
- use **broad-based** to limit the scope of circumvention.

Using instruments: guidelines



Fixed vs. Time-varying:

- Use **fixed** to provide a minimum buffer with a low cost;
- Make **adjustments** with changing circumstances - on sound and transparent principles.

Rules vs. Discretion:

- Use **rules** when risk of inaction is high or risk management capacity is weak ;
- Use **discretion** when structural changes occur but with constraint.



Thank You!

For more information:

IMF Website: www.imf.org

IMF Turkey Website: www.imf.org/Ankara